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CASE DIGEST
EVIDENCE:

Admissions; Opinions

Sears v. Mid-City Motors, Inc., 179 Neb. 100, 136 N.W.2d 428 (1965).
Plaintiffs, owners of a building, brought an action against
their lessee, Mid-City Motors, Inc., and Service Junk Company,
the alleged agent of Mid-City Motors, to recover for damages to
a building, caused by fire. At the conclusion of the evidence,
plaintiffs' suit against Service Junk was dismissed. The case
against Mid-City Motors was allowed to go to the jury and
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs. Mid-City appealed. Plaintiffs cross-appealed from the order dismissing their suit against
Service Junk. In their first opinion, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed the dismissal of Service Junk and reversed
the judgment recovered against Mid-City. See Sears v. Mid-City
Motors, Inc., 178 Neb. 175, 132 N.W.2d 361 (1965). On rehearing,
the Nebraska Supreme Court vacated its previous decision and
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Held: The evidence warranted a judgment exonerating the servant and holding the
master liable for damages that the plaintiffs incurred.
The cause of action arose out of the conduct of two employees
of Service Junk. The defendants, Mid-City Motors (formally
Meeks Rent-A-Car Company) and Service Junk, entered into an
agreement whereby Service Junk agreed to remove the sprinkler
system and to pay to Mid-City the difference between the value
of the material removed and the cost of removal. There was
evidence in the record of the trial that Mid-City would furnish
help to the employees of Service Junk if needed. The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants were liable for the damage because
of negligence in the operation of an acetylene torch used in removing the sprinkler system.
In their first decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
Service Junk was not liable because plaintiffs failed to prove
that the alleged negligent acts of Service Junk's employees caused
the fire. However, the court said that there was evidence admitted against Mid-City alone which the jury was not to consider
against Service Junk. This evidence was in the form of admissions
made by Mid-City in a petition filed by Meeks Rent-A-Car, prior
to the change of its name to Mid-City Motors, against Service
Junk alleging that Service Junk's employees' negligent acts were
the cause of the fire. Plaintiffs contended the admissions in this
petition were sufficient to submit the issue of proximate cause to
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the jury. The Nebraska Supreme Court, in the first decision,
said the admissions were not sufficient to establish a prima Jacie
case of causation because other evidence in the case controverted
these admissions. On rehearing, the court vacated this determination and held that the petition was properly submitted to
the jury for the purpose of establishing causation.
It has geiierally been held .that pleadings may be used against
the pleader as an admission of the facts stated therein. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 242 (1954).
Accordingly, in a situation where
an agent is employed and damage results to both a third party's
property and the principal's property, it is imperative that the
principal consider the consequences before bringing an action
against the agent. If an independent contractor relationship
cannot be shown, the institution of an action against the agent
can have the anomolous effect of holding the principal liable for
the damages to the third party in a subsequent suit against both
principal and agent, although the agent has been completely
exonerated.
There was also a question in the case as to whether certain
opinions as to the cause of the fire given by the president of
Mid-City to an arson investigator should have been admissible
as evidence. Both the trial court and the Supreme Court, in
their first decision, excluded the evidence. This issue was not
discussed in the second reporting of the case. In their first
decision, the Supreme Court citing Kellner v. Whaley, 148 Neb.
259, 27 N.W.2d 183 (1947) said: "To be competent as an admission
a statement must be one of fact, and a statement which is mere
opinion or conclusion of law is as a rule inadmissible." Id. at
269, 27 N.W.2d at 189. However, it should be noted that there
is authority in Nebraska for the admissibility of opinions. See
Johnson v. Kern, 117 Neb. 536, 225 N.W. 38 (1929). See also
Note, 32 NEB. L. REv. 501 (1953).

PRODUCTS

LiBLrIy:

Evidence

Bronson v. J. L. Hudson Co., 376 Mich. 98, 135 N.W.2d 388 (1965).
Action against defendant retailer for injury and damages
allegedly caused by chemical irritants in a ladies undergarment,
a cotton slip, purchased and worn by the plaintiff. Plaintiff's
proof showed that she wore the slip when new, before washing
it. After wearing the article, she developed a rash and her eyes
and tongue became swollen. No indication of rash, dermatitis
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or allergy appeared in the plaintiff's past medical history. Plaintiff's doctor diagnosed the ailment as severe dermatitis. Another
doctor testified that such a cotton garment could cause the
severe dermatitis condition. No direct proof was offered of
what specific irritant if any, was present in the slip, nor was
any direct proof offered that the slip actually caused the ailment.
The lower court granted the retailer's motion for a directed
verdict and the plaintiff-buyer appealed.
The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed, holding that although in the typical products liability case the plaintiff is usually
able to produce some direct proof of defect and causal relationship between that proof and injury, it was error to conclude as
a matter of law, that the plaintiff had not established a prima
facie case. The court stated that from the evidence presented
reasonable minds could differ as to the inference drawn therefrom and that the plaintiff's evidence raised jury questions as
to whether chemical irritants were present in the slip and
whether they caused the plaintiff-buyer's dermatitis.
The liability of a seller of chattels to the ultimate consumer
has continually been extended. See generally PROSSER, TORTS §
95 (3d ed. 1964); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 28 (1956). This
case extends the seller's liability by lessening the plaintiff's burden of proof. The plaintiff no longer needs to show by direct
evidence the causal link between the product and the injury. He
need only bring forth enough evidence so that reasonable men
might infer that the injury was caused by the supplier's productan inference which the defendant must try to rebut before the
question of causation reaches the jury.
Patterson v. George H. Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan. 501, 370 P.2d
116 (1962), reached a similar result. In that case the court held
that the plaintiff need not produce an analysis of the product
so as to show its defect or harmfulness. The plaintiff need only
bring forth enough circumstantial evidence "from which the
simple, reasonable and common-sense inference could be drawn
by the jury" that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the defendant's product. Id. at 505, 370 P.2d at 119.
Nebraska has followed the modern trend of extending the
seller's liability to the consumer by adopting the Uniform Commercial Code. NEB. REV. STAT. (U.C.C.) § 2-314 (1964) establishes
an implied warranty liability against suppliers. This section,
however, leaves the question of evidence to judicial decisions.
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Thus, Bronson and other cases like it will determine the limits
and the effectiveness of that code section.
CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW:

State Reprosecutions

United States v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965).
In a habeas corpus proceeding, relator sought his release from
imprisonment in a state prison under a second degree murder
sentence. Relator had been tried three times on a first degree
murder indictment. After the first trial's conviction of second
degree murder was reversed on appeal, a retrial resulted in a
first degree conviction. This sentence was also reversed, followed
by a second degree sentence secured in a third trial. Held: The
reprosecution of the relator for first degree murder following his
successful appeal of his second degree conviction transgressed
the limitations imposed on the state by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment to reprosecute an individual for the
same crime. Although the third trial resulted only in a second
degree conviction, it is constitutionally inadequate because there
was a reasonable possibility that the jury was influenced by the
first degree indictment.
The dissent argued that Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937) established that a state reprosecution for a higher degree
after a reversal of a lesser degree conviction was not violative
of due process. Although recent decisions may presage the overruling of both the holding and reasoning of Palko, such an incorporation of the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment should
be left to the United States Supreme Court.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to invalidate any state
reprosecutions, the Court derived authority for its proposition
that some limitations exist, first, from the premise implicit in
those Supreme Court cases in which a double jeopardy claim
was interposed against a state. E.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121 (1959). Second, the doctrine of selective incorporation, whereby the fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights are absorbed
by the fourteenth amendment, indicates that at least the basic
core of the double jeopardy guarantee is applicable to the states.
See Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
The New York procedure was
clearly outside the permissible limits of due process whether
tested by federal precedents under the fifth amendment, by the
basic core of the double jeopardy concept, or by the fundamental
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fairness principle of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
The court's holding raises the limitations on state reprosecutions to conformity with those permissible under the federal double jeopardy standard. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
While New York based its reprosecution procedure on a statute
providing that retrials should proceed in all respects as if no
trial had been had, the same procedure is adopted in other states
by judicial authority. See, e.g., Bohanan v. State, 18 Neb. 57, 24
N.W. 390 (1885).
Under such a procedure, the Nebraska rule
is that a conviction for a lesser offense than informed against
is not a bar to reprosecution for a greater offense on retrial.
Macomber v. State, 137 Neb. 882, 291 N.W. 674 (1940). A detailed
analysis of reprosecution problems can be found in Mayers &
Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions,
74 HAav. L. REv. 1 (1960).
CONFLICT OF LAws:

Most Significant Contacts Choice of Laws Rule

Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463
(1965).
Plaintiff, a guest in an automobile, sued the host driver in
New York to recover for injuries received in a two car collision
in Colorado. Both parties were residents of New York, but were
unacquainted before attending summer school in Colorado when
the accident occurred. New York allowed a guest to recover for
ordinary negligence, while Colorado's "guest statute" barred an
action unless the host's negligence consisted of willful and wanton
disregard of the rights of others. Following the "most significant
contacts" rule adopted in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), the appellate division held
that Colorado law governed the relationship. Held: Judgment
affirmed. Under a correct application of the Babcock rule, Colorado had the superior connection with and interest in the issue
of recovery in this host-guest relationship. Here, the site of the
accident was not merely fortuitous, as it was in Babcock, but
arose from a relationship formed and created in Colorado. Both
parties were residing temporarily in Colorado rather than merely
traveling through the state. In addition, Colorado's "guest statute" had the overriding purpose of reserving the assets of negligent host-drivers for injured parties in other cars.
Dissent: Rather than placing undue reliance upon the place
of the guest-host relationship, the relevant consideration should
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be New York's policy of requiring tort-feasors to compensate

guests for negligence. As both parties were domiciled in New
York, the automobile was insured in New York, and New York
would have the burden of caring for the injured parties, New York
law should govern the standard of care required of a host driver.
While the writer of the Babcock opinion was the principal
dissenter in Dym, this resulted not from any disavowal of the
"most significant contacts" rule, but from a disagreement over
which factors should be given controlling weight. The RESTATEMNT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 379, 379a (Tent. Draft No.
9, 1964) supports both opinions. Therefore, the fear of many
attorneys over the uncertainty inherent in the rule has been
realized. See, e.g., Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson-A Practicing
Attorney's Reflections Upon the Opinion and Its Imnplications, 31
INs. COUNSEL J. 428 (1964).
This case clearly indicates a reluctance to extend the Babcock rule to situations where residents of
the state have been absent for longer than a temporary excursion.
The most that can be generalized is that the local law of the
state where the injury occurred will usually be applied, unless
some other state has a greater governmental interest in the relationship, or the specific issue to be determined in the controversy.
Nebraska adheres to the older rule of lex loci delicti, under
which the relationship between a resident host and his guest is
governed by the law of the state where the injury occurred. Whitney v. Penrod, 149 Neb. 636, 32 N.W.2d 131 (1948). The comparative merits and disadvantages of adopting the "most significant
contacts" rule have been extensively commented on. See 63 COLM.
L. REv. 1219 (1963). Some doubt has been cast on the meaning
of the rule by Murphy v. Barron, 45 Misc. 2d 905, 258 N.Y.S.2d 139
(Sup. Ct. 1965), where the Pennsylvania law of contribution between joint tort-feasors was applied to a collision occurring in
Pennsylvania involving New York residents.
TORT:

Recovery For Mental Distress in the Absence of Physical

Injury
Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1965).
Action by a six year old girl through her guardian and next
friend alleging that the defendant knowingly made false statements to her concerning the conduct of her mother. Plaintiff
further alleged that the statements were made "for the purpose
of causing the plaintiff-child undue emotional stress, mental pain

and anguish."
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The Supreme Court of Florida reversed and remanded the
trial court's decision which held that a suit for emotional distress,
in the absence of physical injury, does not state a cause of action.
Infliction of mental distress, as a separate tort, is comparatively recent in origin. See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 11 (3d ed.
1964). The Nebraska Supreme Court in Kurpgeweit v. Kirby, 88
Neb. 72, 129 N.W. 177 (1910), held that a suit for emotional distress, in the absence of physical injury, stated a cause of action.
This holding was restricted in LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty,
126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934) to circumstances where the act
was done wilfully and maliciously rather than resulting from mere
negligence. A further restriction upon this tort action seems inherent in Korbin, which requires the act or statement of the defendant be "intended and reasonably calculated to cause the child
'severe emotional distress.'" (Emphasis added.) Korbin v. Berlin,
177 So. 2d 551, 553 (Fla. 1965).
This test of severity adopted in Korbin is supported by RETORTS, § 46 (Supp. 1948).

STATEMENT,

Nebraska has not required severity as a basis for bringing the
tort action, but only as a basis for the measurement of damages
caused by the tortious act. The adoption of severity as a standard,
although increasing the burden of proof on valid claims, will undoubtedly minimize the existence of fictitious claims.

